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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter comes on before this court on a petition for 
a writ of mandamus in the following circumstances. On 
June 8, 1992, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia sentenced the petitioner, Austen 
O. Nwanze, following his conviction at a jury trial, to prison 
terms of 168 months for various drug of fenses and 60 
months for each of two firearms violations. The court 
ordered Nwanze to serve all the sentences concurrently 
even though one of the two firearms convictions and 
sentences was for using or carrying a firear m in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 924(c) during or in relation to certain other 
offenses. Subsequently, the district court amended the 
judgment of conviction and sentence so that the 60-month 
sentence on the section 924(c) conviction ran consecutively 
to the other sentences as required by section 924(c)(1)(A). 
Consequently, Nwanze's sentence became 228 months. 
Nwanze appealed from the amended judgment of conviction 
and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit which affirmed on September 24, 1993, in 
an unpublished opinion. 
 
Thereafter, Nwanze filed a motion in the Eastern District 
of Virginia to vacate the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 2255. The district court denied that motion and once 
again on appeal the court of appeals affir med. 
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After the failure of Nwanze's section 2255 petition, the 
Supreme Court in Bailey v. United States , 516 U.S. 137, 
116 S.Ct. 501 (1995), held that a defendant could not be 
convicted of using a firearm under section 924(c) unless the 
government proved that the defendant"actively employed 
the firearm during and in relation to the predicate crime." 
Id. at 150, 116 S.Ct. 509. While Bailey was not concerned 
directly with the "carries" prong of section 924(c), the 
government in this proceeding has conceded that "[a] 
review of the facts of this case would indicate that Nwanze's 
conviction would in all likelihood, be vacated under Bailey 
and existing Fourth Circuit authority." App. at 23. 
 
In reliance on Bailey, Nwanze attempted to file a second 
motion under section 2255 in the Eastern District of 
Virginia to vacate his sentence, but he was not successful 
as the district court and the court of appeals denied him 
authorization to proceed under the Antiterr orist and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDP A") because his 
motion was an unauthorized second or successive motion. 
While the orders of the courts do not expr essly so recite, 
the parties believe that the district and cir cuit courts 
denied him permission to proceed as, in their view, Bailey 
did not adopt a new rule of constitutional law ther eby 
justifying the filing of the petition. See App. at 40-44; 28 
U.S.C. S 2255(2). These dispositions left Nwanze in the 
unfortunate position of being compelled to serve afive-year 
term of imprisonment, at the end of the balance of his 
confinement for his other offenses, for conduct that was not 
criminal within the scope of the statute pursuant to which 
he had been convicted and sentenced. 
 
The denial of Nwanze's motion, however, did not 
necessarily leave him without a remedy for our opinion in 
In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997), suggested that 
a prisoner in his situation after the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Bailey could seek habeas corpus r elief under 28 
U.S.C. S 2241 in a district court in the district in which he 
was confined, even though ordinarily a petitioner should 
advance a challenge to a conviction and sentence thr ough 
the means of a motion under section 2255 in the 
sentencing court. See Dorsainvil, 119 F .3d at 252. Thus, in 
reliance on Dorsainvil, Nwanze filed a pro se habeas corpus 
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petition in the Western District of Pennsylvania under 
section 2241, which he asserted was justified as the 
gatekeeping provisions of section 2255 as enacted by the 
AEDPA barred him from relief under that section. 
 
The government filed a response to the petition 
suggesting, as we have indicated, that on the merits 
Nwanze was entitled to relief under Bailey . Nevertheless, it 
contended that he should pursue that relief in the Eastern 
District of Virginia either under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 or by 
filing an application seeking "a writ of err or coram nobis, a 
writ of audita querela, or a writ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1651." App. at 20. Accordingly, the government argued 
that the district court should dismiss the petition or, 
alternatively, transfer the case to the Easter n District of 
Virginia. Significantly, the gover nment pointed out that if 
the court vacated Nwanze's conviction under section 924(c), 
he would be exposed to enhancements of his sentencing 
level, "including, but not limited to a two-point 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. S 2K2.1," dealing with 
unlawful receipt, possession or transportation of firearms. 
 
The district court referred the petition to a magistrate 
judge for a report and recommendation. See Nwanze v. 
Hahn, 97 F. Supp.2d 665, 666 (W.D. Pa. 2000). In her 
comprehensive report and recommendation, the magistrate 
judge described the background of the case and pointed out 
that "[a]s a general proposition only matters concerning the 
conditions of confinement or the execution of a sentence 
are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court 
presiding in the district in which a prisoner is 
incarcerated." Id. at 669 (inter nal quotation marks omitted). 
On the other hand, "[c]hallenges to the validity of a federal 
prisoner's conviction or sentence should be pr esented to 
the sentencing court." Id. Thus, the magistrate judge 
concluded that under section "2241 jurisprudence, the 
issues raised in [Nwanze's] petition would not usually be 
within the jurisdiction of [the Wester n District of 
Pennsylvania]." Id. 
 
The magistrate judge nevertheless recognized that 
Dorsainvil stood for the proposition that r esort to section 
2241 habeas corpus relief was warranted if the Bailey claim 
otherwise could not be asserted. But the magistrate judge 
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distinguished Dorsainvil on the ground that there, unlike 
the situation here, two circuits wer e not involved as 
"Dorsainvil was tried, convicted and sentenced within the 
Third Circuit [whereas] Nwanze was tried, convicted and 
sentenced within the Fourth Circuit and now seeks to have 
[the Western District] Court to bestow upon him the benefit 
of the Third Circuit's Dorsainvil decision." Id. at 670. 
 
The magistrate judge next discussed Alamin v. Gerlinski, 
30 F. Supp.2d 464 (M.D. Pa. 1998), in which the district 
court in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the petitioner's 
place of confinement, in circumstances mirr oring those 
here, transferred a section 2241 petition to the Western 
District of North Carolina where the petitioner had been 
convicted. Following the transfer, the transferee district 
court granted the petitioner relief and vacated his 60- 
month sentence for violation of section 924(c) in a situation 
in which the conviction could not be reconciled with Bailey. 
The magistrate judge indicated that she was "persuaded by 
the logic of the Alamin example," Nwanze, 97 F. Supp.2d at 
671, and thus she recommended that the court transfer 
Nwanze's petition to the Eastern District of V irginia. Id. at 
672. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's 
report and recommendation following which Nwanze 
appealed to this court. 
 
When the clerk of this court examined the notice of 
appeal, she recognized that inasmuch as or dinarily "orders 
transferring venue are not immediately appealable," 
Carteret Sav. Bank v. Shushan, 919 F .2d 225, 228 (3d Cir. 
1990), it appeared that we lacked appellate jurisdiction. 
Consequently, she submitted the case to a panel of this 
court so that the panel could consider whether to dismiss 
the appeal. The panel examined the case and deter mined 
that we did not have appellate jurisdiction but that we had 
discretion to treat the notice of appeal as a petition for 
mandamus. See Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 
773 (3d Cir. 1984). The panel also concluded that 
inasmuch as it was doubtful that Nwanze could have in the 
first instance filed his petition for habeas corpus under 
section 2241 in the Eastern District of V irginia, it appeared 
"that the District Court might have acted beyond its 
authority in transferring [his] habeas corpus petition to the 
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sentencing court." Thus, the panel order ed that the notice 
of appeal be treated as a petition for mandamus. This court 
then appointed an attorney for Nwanze and, after briefs 




In considering this matter, we first point out that we are 
exercising original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1651 
rather than appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1291 or 
some other statutory authority. Consequently, we must be 
particularly circumspect in our exercise of our authority 
here. In this regard, we quote our opinion in Hahnemann 
University Hospital v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 
1996) (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks 
omitted): 
 
       The writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy that a court 
       should grant only in extraordinary circumstances in 
       response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation 
       of power. Given its drastic nature, a writ of mandamus 
       should not be issued where relief may be obtained 
       through an ordinary appeal. Thus, in addition to the 
       jurisdictional prerequisites inher ent in the language of 
       [28 U.S.C. S] 1651(a), two additional pr erequisites for 
       issuance of a writ are: (1) that petitioner have no other 
       adequate means to attain the desired relief, and (2) 
       that petitioner meet its burden of showing that its right 
       to the writ is clear and indisputable. Even when these 
       prerequisites are met, issuance of the writ is largely 
       discretionary, bearing in mind the unfortunate 
       consequence of making the judge a litigant and the 
       highly disfavored effect of piecemeal appellate review.1 
 
Moreover, as we indicated in Carter et, "the clear error 
[justifying the issuance of the writ] should at least 
approach the magnitude of an unauthorized exer cise of 
judicial power [and] [f]inally the party seeking the relief 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We recognize that the district judge no longer is a respondent in a 
mandamus case. See Fed. R. App. P. 21. Nevertheless, we believe that 
the essential standards for issuing a writ of mandamus have not 
changed. 
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must have no other adequate means to attain the desired 
relief." 919 F.2d at 232-33 (inter nal citations, brackets, and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
Nwanze, who is well aware of the foregoing standards, 
summarizes his argument as follows: 
 
       The Petition for Writ of Mandamus is appr opriate since 
       no other remedial relief exists. In this matter, Mr. 
       Nwanze has properly filed a writ of habeas corpus that 
       must be determined in the court where it was filed. No 
       legal reason exists to transfer the matter to a court 
       without jurisdiction. Finally, Mr. Nwanze's right to 
       relief is clear and indisputable so granting of the writ 
       of mandamus is appropriate and just. 
 
Br. at 10. Thus, Nwanze emphasizes that it is particularly 
appropriate to grant the writ to provide r elief from a 
transfer order where, as he apparently believes is the 
situation here, the transferee court does not have 
jurisdiction and the petitioner has no other way to obtain 
relief. Of course, he also relies on Dorsainvil to demonstrate 
that the district court in the Wester n District of 
Pennsylvania had jurisdiction to grant him habeas r elief. 
 
In considering this matter, we point out that inasmuch as 
a Bailey issue challenges the validity of a conviction, 
ordinarily a petitioner should present the issue to the 
sentencing court rather than the court in the district in 
which he is confined. But in this case Nwanze believes that 
the gatekeeping provisions in section 2255 for eclose that 
possibility as the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
already has precluded him from filing a second or 
successive section 2255 motion. Nevertheless, if the gate 
closed by section 2255 somehow could be opened in the 
Eastern District of Virginia, Nwanze should seek relief 
there, as that exercise of jurisdiction would be in harmony 
with the congressional jurisdictional scheme in sections 
2241 and 2255. 
 
Of course, one way to open the gate, albeit indir ectly, 
would be to allow the petitioner to seek habeas corpus relief 
under section 2241. See Dorsainvil, 119 F .3d at 251; see 
also In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2000). We 
question, however, whether such a petition could be filed in 
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the district of the sentencing court except in cases in which 
that court happened to be in the same district in which the 
petitioner was confined. Of course, allowing a petitioner to 
raise the Bailey issue in a section 2241 petition in the 
sentencing court only in those circumstances would be 
quite arbitrary, because the ability of the sentencing court 
to consider a petitioner's section 2241 petition would be 
dependent on sheer happenstance. In any event, we have 
serious doubt that the transfer of the case can be justified 
on the theory that Nwanze could have brought his habeas 
corpus petition in the district court in the Easter n District 
of Virginia, and if not, it would be difficult to justify the 
transfer order on that basis. See Chatman-Bey v. 
Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 28 U.S.C. 
S 1404(a) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in 
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil 
action to any other district or division wher e it might have 
been brought."); see also Dorsainvil, 119 F.2d at 252 
(motion for certification of second section 2255 petition 
denied without prejudice to filing a section 2241 petition in 
the district of confinement).2 
 
Our suggestion that it is doubtful that an inter -district 
transfer of a section 2241 petition may be made fr om the 
district of confinement to the district of sentencing to 
continue to be treated after transfer as a section 2241 
petition, does not overlook the litigation in Alamin v. 
Gerlinski, 30 F. Supp.2d at 464, and Alamin v. Gerlinski, 73 
F. Supp.2d 607 (W.D.N.C. 1999), to which the magistrate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We are satisfied that section 1404(a) applies to transfers of habeas 
corpus petitions, see United States ex r el. Meadows v. New York, 426 
F.2d 1176, 1183 n.9 (2d Cir. 1970), as habeas corpus petitions are 
technically civil actions and we see no reason why that section should 
not apply to them. See Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4, 91 
S.Ct. 995, 998 n.4 (1971); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2). We note that 
the parties are in agreement that Nwanze could not have instituted this 
section 2241 proceeding in the Eastern District of Virginia. We also note 
that it is quite clear that ordinarily a transfer of a section 2241 
proceeding relating to the validity of the petitioner's conviction from 
the 
district of confinement to the district of sentencing would be in 
furtherance of the convenience of the parties and witnesses. See 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 249; Meadows , 426 F.2d at 1183 n.9. 
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judge referred.3 Ther e the district court in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, the situs of the petitioner's 
confinement, transferred his section 2241 petition to the 
Western District of North Carolina, the situs of his 
sentencing, after the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit did not permit the petitioner tofile an application 
for relief under section 2255 following the decision in 
Bailey. While we do not doubt that both district courts in 
Alamin took a common sense approach to the problem 
before them, still they seem not to have considered whether 
28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) barred the transfer , as the petitioner 
might not have been able to institute the action in North 
Carolina. Moreover, the parties in Alamin agreed that if the 
Pennsylvania district court did not dismiss the petition it 
should be transferred to the North Carolina court. Alamin, 
30 F. Supp.2d at 468. 
 
We need not, however, be overly concer ned with the 
limitations on transfer in section 1404(a), as we believe that 
there is at least a plausible argument that if Nwanze has no 
other remedy in the district of his conviction and 
sentencing, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir cuit 
would approve of the district court's exer cising jurisdiction 
under the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1651(a) to grant him a 
writ of error coram nobis. See United States v. Shamy, 886 
F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 
1067 (4th Cir. 1988). If such be the case, then the district 
court in the Western District of Pennsylvania would not 
have transferred this case to a court without jurisdiction. In 
both Shamy and Mandel, the petitioners had been 
convicted of mail fraud and racketeering.4  Subsequently, 
long after their convictions had been affir med and the 
petitioners had completed service of their sentences, the 
Supreme Court held in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 
350, 107 S.Ct. 2875 (1987), that the mail fraud statute, 18 
U.S.C. S 1341, did not extend to schemes to defraud 
persons of their intangible rights such as the right to 
honest government. Relying on McNally, the petitioners in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. It is the belief of the panel that the corr ect spelling of the 
respondent's 
name in the Alamin litigation is Gerlinski and thus we have corrected the 
incorrect spelling of the name in the caption in the North Carolina case. 
 
4. Shamy also involved wire fraud. 
 
                                9 
  
both cases filed motions for a writ of err or coram nobis, 
unsuccessfully in Shamy, but successfully in Mandel. On 
the appeals, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir cuit 
made it clear that if McNally had been extant at the time of 
the petitioners' direct appeals, it would have reversed the 
convictions. See Shamy, 886 F.2d at 745; Mandel, 862 F.2d 
at 1074. In reaching this result, the court concluded that 
the "jury instructions . . . improperly allowed petitioners' 
convictions for acts which are not within the r each of the 
mail fraud statute." Id. at 1075. Thus, the court in both 
cases held that a writ of coram nobis should issue. 
 
We think that unless the district court in the Eastern 
District of Virginia can grant r elief on another basis, it is 
likely that it will follow the logic of Mandel  and Shamy 
when it considers Nwanze's case and thus exer cise 
jurisdiction. It is true that Mandel and Shamy are 
distinguishable from this case because the petitioners there 
had served their sentences before seeking the writs of 
coram nobis and Nwanze has not started serving his 60- 
month sentence on the section 924(c) conviction. 
Nevertheless, we think that the Virginia court probably will 
regard that distinction as making it all the more compelling 
for it to exercise jurisdiction and grant Nwanze relief. After 
all, can it seriously be argued that a person who has not 
yet served an illegal sentence is less in need of r elief from 
its imposition than a person who has served it? 
Accordingly, while we cannot be certain that the Virginia 
court will exercise jurisdiction and consider Nwanze's 
petition on the merits, still we are confident enough that it 
will do so that we will exercise our discr etion to deny 
Nwanze's petition for a writ of mandamus. 
 
We are encouraged to reach our r esult by the practical 
circumstance here. In United States v. Goggins, 99 F.3d 116 
(3d Cir. 1996), we held that when a district court after 
Bailey vacated the sentence it previously entered on a 
section 924(c)(1) conviction, the court could r esentence the 
defendant on the remaining count of conviction after 
increasing his offense level by 2 levels under U.S.S.G. 
S 2D1.1(b)(1). While we express no opinion on the question 
of whether if the Virginia district court vacates Nwanze's 
conviction on the section 924(c) conviction, it should 
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resentence him on the basis of an enhanced sentencing 
level on the remaining counts, we are r eluctant to foreclose 
that possibility. Indeed, the Court in Bailey  recognized that 
even if the "uses" prong of section 924(c) is inapplicable, 
the Sentencing Guidelines might provide a basis for 
enhancing the sentencing level. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 150, 
116 S.Ct. at 509. Therefore, it would be better for Nwanze 
to obtain relief under Bailey fr om the sentencing court 
rather than from the court in the district of confinement as 
we have some doubt as to whether the latter court could 
resentence on the remaining counts. 
 
Moreover, our conclusion in this r espect takes into 
account a circumstance that we noted in Goggins, that "if 
the district court knew at the time of the original 
sentencing that it could not sentence on all the counts on 
which the defendant was convicted, it might have imposed 
a greater sentence on the counts on which it could 
sentence validly." Goggins, 99 F.3d at 119. We think that 
only the sentencing court can know what its intentions 
would have been if it had been sentencing on the r emaining 
counts without imposing a sentence under section 924(c). 
See also United States v. Davis, 112 F.2d 118, 122-23 (3d 
Cir. 1997); Alamin v. Gerlinski, 73 F . Supp.2d at 611-12. 
 
We close our discussion with the following comment. 
While we have reached our result on the basis of our belief 
that the United States District Court for the Easter n 
District of Virginia will address Nwanze's request for relief 
from his section 924(c) conviction and sentence on the 
merits, we recognize that we could be wr ong in that 
expectation. Thus, though we will deny the petition for a 
writ of mandamus, we do so without prejudice to Nwanze's 
reinstituting his habeas corpus petition in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, or in such other district in which 
he may be confined, if the Virginia court denies him relief 
on jurisdictional grounds. Finally, while we r ecognize that 
Nwanze would be delayed in obtaining relief if he must 
reinstitute his habeas corpus petition, we doubt that the 
delay would prejudice him, as it appears that he still would 
be serving his 168-month sentence when he again sought 
relief in the district of his confinement. The parties shall 
bear their own costs in this matter. 
 




For the foregoing reasons the petition for a writ of 
mandamus will be denied. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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